desk

DPRK U.S. Desk on Kumchang-ri Issue and Korea U.S. Policy

Here are remarks by Ri Gun, DPRK deputy ambassador to the U.N. and a DPRK representative in the Four-Way Talks, on the DPRK’s U.S. policy and other issues of principle, which appeared on the Dec. 31 issue of the south Korean weekly magazine “Hankyoreh 21.” (Original in Korean)

Q: Suspicion on underground facilities in Kumchang-ri, raised by the U.S. intelligence authorities has turned the situation to the extent of possible cancellation of the Geneva nuclear accord. As a representative in the DPRK-U.S. talks, how do you analyze this situation?

Ri: We regard the recent DPRK-US relations as serious, but we are prepared for them in every direction. Since the DPRK and the U.S. signed the Geneva nuclear accord in 1994, we have made efforts to confide in the U.S., and sincerely dealt with the issues raised at the bilateral talks. However, the U.S. has brought a great disappointment to us. The promised heavy oil has not been supplied as planned. Economic sanctions against our country have not been eased yet. It is quite obvious that the completion of light water reactors, slated for 2003, will be delayed.

In this situation, the U.S. raised the nuclear issue of Kumchang-ri, and suddenly stiffened its attitude toward us.

With the agreed items not being fully implemented, and our desire for food assistance not satisfied, the U.S. one-sidedly made a demand which is related to its national interest and world domination policy. We can not accept the U.S. domination policy against the DPRK any more.

The U.S. fundamental policy can be termed a “salami sausage policy.” It’s like giving an innutritious piece one by one to its opponent in order to gradually weaken it and finally remove its leadership.

During the period, some leading U.S. companies visited our country for a research of the latter’s industrial base and business negotiations, and expressed their willingness for investment. However, not even one U.S. company has ever made investments in the DPRK. That’s because our country has been regarded as an object of economic sanctions.

Humanitarian food aid has been promoted within the framework of the U.S. security policy. Given this condition, how can we expect progress in the bilateral relations? If the U.S. thinks us like Iraq, that’s a big mistake. We believe that the U.S. understands well our military strength and dares not to make provocation. The U.S. must have read our army’s firm resolution and countermeasure strategy, which was made public by a spokesman for the general staff of the Korean People’s Army. We will maintain a thorough one-versus-one mutual principle in relation with the U.S. If the latter behaves aggressively, we respond with aggressiveness, and if the latter behaves friendly, we respond with friendship. This is our fundamental U.S. policy.

The present situation permits neither a prospect nor an assumption. Many people asked me about the time when liaison offices between the two countries will be set up. Its possibility was very high until some time ago, when the two sides reached basic agreement except for a couple of matters. Now, however, discussing this matter is not given consideration.

Q: If Kumchang-ri is not related to nukes, it can be open to anybody. How come the north demands 300 million dollars for its inspection?

Ri: The U.S., which swallowed information provided by domestic intelligence agencies, has been taking an offensive attitude, demanding its unconditional inspection of Kumchang-ri.

In June 1993, the two sides made public a joint statement in New York on “recognition of sovereignty,” and “non-intervention in domestic affairs.” The U.S. demand for opening of Kumchang-ri facilities violates this principle.

Despite our explanation that those facilities are nuclear-free, the U.S. has been threatening cancellation of the Geneva accord based on its own judgement, and heightening war atmosphere. It is the firm attitude of the DPRK leadership that it will never permit such a threatening attitude.

News reports in the U.S. and south Korea, while giving no explanation to its background, say that we are unconditionally demanding money in relation to the opening of Kumchang-ri facilities. What we demand is compensation for inspection of Kumchang-ri facilities by the U.S. It is a proper right for a sovereign country to make such a demand.

Our compensation demand to the U.S. is based on three reasons.

First, we can not allow the U.S. to pay no respect to its counterpart of the nuclear accord while the two sides have been implementing it, and to one-sidedly take a hostile attitude toward us based on inaccurate data provided by its domestic intelligence agencies.

Second, a blind acceptance of U.S. cavil may drive us into a situation like that of Iraq, and invite endless demands for inspection of our other military and industrial facilities.

Third, in view of the fact that the bilateral relations are not friendly but hostile, the opening of facilities with a state interest will degrade the original importance and effect of the facilities. Thus, it generates a money problem for its reconstruction or reconversion. That’s the reason why we demand compensation to a certain degree.

It is unlikely that a man demands no charge when the other, who is in a hostile relation with himself, frisks him.

Q: What is the ground of your claim that the U.S. takes a hostile attitude toward the north? As a matter of fact, it is the U.S., which has led food assistance (campaign) in the international community. In spite of protests in Congress, the U.S. government seems to have followed dove policy toward Korea.

Ri: One of our concerns is a shift in U.S. Korea policy. The U.S. policy, until some time ago, put emphasis on killing the possibility of our provoking a war. Now, the U.S. is based on the principle that it will deliver a blow if we do not listen to its word. Based on its experiences in Iraq, the U.S. went beyond simple threatening, and made public its possible scenarios. Thus, we take preparatory measures against it and concentrate military power. That’s what some claim to be a war preparation.

Although former defense minister Perry was appointed as a Korean Peninsula negotiator, we were not given prior consultation or information. Although the DPRK-U.S. relation constitutes an important element in the Korean Peninsula relations, the U.S. one-sidedly behaved in this style.

According to reports by south Korean newspapers in early December, there was some progress made in the DPRK-U.S. talks. In actuality, however, there was no development. If there was something, that was, that the U.S. understood our firm stance and our limit line.

Q: Stagnancy in the DPRK-U.S. talks will dim prospects for the four-way talks. Is it all right to consider that the four-way talks scheduled for February are not related to the present DPRK-U.S. relations? Meanwhile, Japan has recently proposed to develop the four-party dialogue into a six-party one including Japan and Russia. What’s the north’s position on this proposal?

Honestly speaking, the four-way talks are on a line extended from the DPRK-U.S. dialogue. In the present abnormal DPRK-U.S. relations, the four-way talks can play no role. Lying behind the talks is U.S. strategy. Some time ago, Japan proposed to enlarge the four-way talks into six-party talks including Japan and Russia. It is rather the U.S. than we, that will not accept this proposal. It appears that there are still many people who can not understand the Korean Peninsula policy of the U.S. When the question of four-way talks was raised, the U.S. excluded Russia from it, in spite of the latter’s strong resistance. That’s due to the U.S. concept of the talks. If Japan is eager to participate in the talks for her own interest, it is wrong to propose it to the south. A prior consultation with the U.S. will be required.

In the last DPRK-U.S. talks held in New York, the two sides temporarily agreed to meet again before the four-ways talks slated for February.

As a representative at both the bilateral talks and the four-way talks, I spent considerable time with Americans. Through contacts with them, I reached a conclusion that the U.S. Korean-Peninsula Policy is based on an already written guideline. It may be appropriate to say that what the U.S. plans in its Korean-Peninsula policy is a peace system of a certain level and an inter-Korean exchange. We take the stand that in the four-way talks, the issue of concluding a peace treaty should be discussed with the U.S., and inter-Korean issues between the north and the south. Although the U.S. and the south can be cooperative in their relation, the south Korean government should know that the south-US relations would not influence the north-US relations. The Kim Yong Sam administration must have learned lessons on it. Some time ago, when President Clinton visited Seoul, Kim Dae Jung reportedly asked him to increase the U.S. food aid to and ease economic sanctions against the north. And Clinton appreciated the Mt. Kumgang tourist project.

When we look at these two issues, the former is influenced by the U.S.’ unique decision concerning the strategy for Northeastern Asia and the Korean Peninsula while the latter is by the inter-Korean situation. I hear many times that the DJ administration is different from the YS era. Honestly speaking, we don’t know about it, and just observe things. If a breakthrough is made in the DPRK-US talks, and if the four-way talks are advanced, we may gain a new experience.

Some claim that the DPRK-US relations are vague. That view is wrong. The problem pending between the two countries is clear and simple. If the U.S. alter its aggressive and blocking attitude, we are ready to develop bilateral relations in an amicable manner. Now that the four-way talks, which reflect the US intentions, have already started, we hope an approach to the national issue will be made by the leadership of the north and the south.

***

The interviewer is professor Ri Chang Ju at George Washington University.

Back Home